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The purpose of this Study is to calculate retirement account
tax expenditures by states. States with income taxes that allow tax
deferral of retirement account contributions and investment
earnings lose nearly $20 billion in revenue. This Study uses a
variety of data sources, including state reports from their executive
agencies and known estimation techniques to calculate the amount
of tax credits that a worker in each state would receive if the
deferrals were converted to a refundable tax credit. The average
credit under these estimation techniques and calculations would
be $172.
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INTRODUCTION

This article presents the first study to calculate how much
states spend in foregone tax revenue to prop up the nation’s
failing retirement system. Despite over $120 billion in federal
and state taxpayer subsidies for retirement savings projected
each year for the next ten years,1 the nation faces a retirement
income crisis. Though the base layer of household retirement
income (Social Security) is solid, the targets of federal and state
retirement account tax subsidies—voluntary workplace
retirement plans such as defined benefit (DB) and defined
contribution (DC) plans—are insufficient and eroding.2 In the
forty years since they were first established, 401(k) plans have
virtually replaced DB plans in the private sector.3 The system of
voluntary, tax-favored retirement accounts has failed to produce
adequate account balances for the workers who have accounts,
and has failed to extend coverage to over half of the workforce who
do not have accounts.4
A household’s retirement savings comes from three places:
the worker, the employer, and the government.5 The federal
government and, increasingly, state governments subsidize
retirement savings in the form of tax deductions and deferrals—
not refundable tax credits.6 As this article illustrates, over 80%

1. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR
2016, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 226 (2015), available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2016/assets/spec.pdf
[hereinafter OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET].
2. Teresa Ghilarducci & Joelle Saad-Lessler, Explaining the Decline in the Offer
Rate of Employer Retirement Plans Between 2003 and 2012, 68 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
REV., 807, 807-08 (2015).
3. Barbara A. Butrica et al., The Disappearing Defined Benefit Pension and
Its Potential Impact on the Retirement Incomes of Baby Boomers, 69 SOC. SEC.
BULLETIN 3 (2009).
4. Ghilarducci & Saad-Lessler, supra note 2, at 808-09.
5. The government provides tax deductions to qualified taxpayers for retirement
accounts. Many employers contribute to their employees’ defined contribution or
defined benefit plans. And employees directly contribute to DC plans. See JASON
FURMAN, CHAIRMAN, COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, THE BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER &
THE CONCORD COALITION, REMARKS ON RETIREMENT SECURITY 1 (May 12, 2015),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/remarks_on_social_security_and_
retirement_security_jf_10.23.13.pdf; see also Retirement Plans, Benefits & Savings:
Types
of
Retirement
Plans,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/retirement/typesofplans.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2015).
6. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 113TH CONG., 2D SESS., JCX-97-14,
ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2014-2018 4 (2014)
[hereinafter J. COMM. ON TAXATION].
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of the tax subsidies for retirement accounts come from the federal
government; yet, the share of state indirect spending on
retirement plans is significant and not well appreciated or
known.7 The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) and Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) use different methodologies to
calculate the size of the tax expenditures.8 In 2014, the JCT
calculated a federal retirement tax expenditure of $94.6 billion,
and calculates $805.1 billion for the next five years (2014-2018).9
The OMB estimates for the same expenditures are $146.4 billion
for 2014 and $828.5 billion for 2014-2018.10 We use the more
conservative JCT method to value state retirement tax subsidies
in this paper, in order to not bias our estimates upwards—not
because one methodology is superior to the other.
Using the JCT’s conservative method, we find that the size of
the states’ subsidies to the voluntary retirement account system
is substantial: nearly $20 billion in 2014. Despite their size,
however, state retirement account subsidies are rarely
discussed.11 This article represents a first attempt to measure the
tax expenditures for retirement accounts at the state level. One
reason that state tax expenditures for retirement accounts have
not been analyzed is because state reports are inconsistent, at
best, if they exist at all.12 For example, three states do not publish
tax expenditure reports and only eighteen states itemize their
retirement tax expenditures. As such, our reported total is
derived mainly through estimation.
We conclude that, without federal or state treasuries having
to forgo additional revenue each year, all working Americans
could have a retirement account if the preferential treatment was
a refundable tax credit and not a deduction. If such treatment
7. We estimate that states spent over $20 billion in 2014 on tax subsidies for
retirement accounts. If we add this figure to the federal retirement tax expenditure
estimate of $94.6 billion for the same year, we arrive at total retirement tax
expenditure of over $114 billion in 2014—with federal tax subsidies for retirement
accounts making up more than 80% of the total. See Ghilarducci et al., Retirement
Savings Tax Expenditures: The Need for Refundable Tax Credits, SCHWARTZ CTR. FOR
ECON.
POLICY
ANALYSIS
(June
2015),
http://www.economicpolicyresearch.org/images/docs/retirement_security_background/
Retirement_Savings_Tax_Expenditures.pdf.
8. See J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 6, at 1-2.
9. Id. at 32.
10. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 1, at 226.
11. See Michael Leachman et. al., Promoting State Budget Accountability
Through Tax Expenditure Reporting, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 7-8 (May
2011), http://www.cbpp.org/files/5-11-11sfp.pdf
12. Id. at 3-4.
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occurred, more than eighty million more workers in 2015 would
have had a retirement account, and the refundable tax credits
would have been about $800 to each taxpayer.13 Further, if the
tax deduction had been a refundable tax credit protected from
early withdrawal, the distribution of the subsidy would have been
progressive and coverage universal. As a result, the median
retirement account balance in this country would be over $70,000,
instead of zero.14
This article is divided into four Parts. Part I introduces the
concept of tax expenditures. Part II describes the relationship
between U.S. savings policies and tax favoritism. Part III
discusses how retirement tax expenditures are both effective in
raising retirement savings and highly regressive. Part IV
discusses conversion of retirement deductions and deferrals to
credits that can be directly deposited in guaranteed retirement
accounts. The Appendix to this article describes the methodology
used in computing state tax expenditures.
II.

RETIREMENT TAX EXPENDITURES AND SAVINGS

This Part is divided into three parts. Part A. provides an
overview of retirement savings policy in the United States. Part
B. discusses the size of the federal retirement tax expenditures,
and Part C. discusses the size of the, until now, hidden state
retirement tax expenditures.

13. See Ghilarducci et al., supra note 7, at 1 (dividing the total tax expenditure
by the number of taxpayers).
14. We assume that each worker would receive a combined credit of $819, which
would be deposited directly into a retirement savings account. If this process of
reinvestment was fast-forwarded for forty years of employment, assuming an
annualized rate of return of 3.5%, the average worker in the United States not
participating in a retirement plan at work would save approximately $72,489. See
generally Ghilarducci et al., supra note 7, at 4, 6, 16. Households near retirement
(ages 55-64) and without an employer-sponsored retirement plan had a median
balance of zero in retirement savings as of 2012. See Joelle Saad-Lessler et al., Are
U.S. Workers Ready for Retirement? Trends in Plan Sponsorship, Participation, and
Preparedness,
SCHWARTZ CTR. FOR ECON. POLICY ANALYSIS (2015),
http://www.economicpolicyresearch.org/images/docs/research/retirement_security/Are
_US_Workers_Ready_for_Retirement.pdf, [hereinafter Are U.S. Workers Ready for
Retirement?].
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A. OVERVIEW OF UNITED STATES RETIREMENT SAVINGS
POLICY
The federal and state governments have played a major role
in the funding and distributional equity of the nation’s retirement
system for over 100 years.15 At the early part of the 20th century,
three trends shaped United States retirement policy: (1) federal,
state, and municipal public sector retirement plans were
expanded alongside the railroad retirement system; (2) Social
Security was established for almost all workers; and (3) the
income tax code became an important tool for the government to
incentivize public and private employers and their workers to
save for retirement.16
The use of the tax code to promote prefunded retirement
plans dates back over ninety years17 to the 1921 Revenue Act,18
which eliminated current taxation of employer stock bonuses and
profit sharing plans, and eventually pension trusts. Later, the
1942 Revenue Act19 dramatically increased corporate income tax
rates during World War II.20 At the same time, corporations were
exempt from these taxes if they engaged in activities that served
a social purpose21—payment in the form of deferred compensation
or in the form of employee benefits. Payment in such forms of
compensation helped curb inflation and provide social insurance
on the job through health insurance, vacation funds, disability
insurance pools, and retirement plans.22
The 1942 Revenue Act raised revenue to be sure. However,
it also initiated the modern era of the United States Government
using the income tax system as a tool to induce more retirement
savings for workers and employers.23 Therefore, both the federal
15. See generally Gordon P. Goodfellow & Sylvester J. Schieber, Death and Taxes:
Can We Fund For Retirement Between Them?, in THE FUTURE OF PENSIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES 126, 128-29 (Ray Schmitt ed., 1993); see also Revenue Act of 1921, ch.
136, Pub. L. No. 67-98, 42 Stat. 227 (1921).
16. See generally DORA L. COSTA, THE EVOLUTION OF RETIREMENT: AN AMERICAN
ECONOMIC HISTORY, 1880-1990 6-31 (Univ. of Chicago Press ed., 1998),
http://www.nber.org/chapters/c6108.
17. Goodfellow & Schieber, supra note 15, at 128-29.
18. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, Pub. L. No. 67-98, 42 Stat. 227 (1921).
19. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, Pub. L. No. 77-753, 56 Stat. 798 (1942).
20. COSTA, supra note 16, at 17.
21. Lily L. Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for
Refundable Tax Credits, 59 STAN L. REV. 23, 42-44 (2006).
22. TERESA GHILARDUCCI, LABOR’S CAPITAL: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF
PRIVATE PENSIONS 45 (MIT Press Ed., 1992).
23. Id. at 35, 153.

GHILARDUCCIFINAL (1) (DO NOT DELETE)

94

BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW

6/2/2016 7:54 AM

[Vol. 17.1

government and the states have long been committed to the goal
of retirement income security. This is because, under our welfare
state system of providing universal social insurance through
private markets, providing tax incentives to employers and
workers to set up voluntary retirement savings vehicles was the
most important tool to achieve that goal.
In 1974, the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act24
was established in order for Congress to keep track of the amount
of money that the federal government was spending, indirectly, to
provide public goods.25 The Act required calculations of tax
expenditures to be included in the federal budget.26 Many states
have not been fastidious in their reporting or assessment of the
fairness and effectiveness of the retirement account tax
expenditures.27 Tax expenditures are made up of special tax
exclusions and deferrals for retirement savings accounts, and are
referred to as “tax expenditures” because the revenue losses to the
federal or state treasury are analogous to direct spending
programs.28
Income tax rules without special preferences for retirement
savings would mean that employer and employee contributions to
qualified retirement and pension plans, and the earnings from
these assets, would all be taxed as ordinary income. The current
net exclusion of pension contributions and earnings allow
taxpayers to exclude employer or individual retirement
contributions from their gross income, and to defer taxes on the
contributions and the investment-income earned on these savings
until money is withdrawn.29 Among these qualified retirement
vehicles are 401(k) plans, traditional Individual Retirement
Arrangements (IRAs), Roth IRAs (with tax subsidy granted upon
withdrawal), DB plans, and DC plans.
The Joint Committee on Taxation report (JCT Report),

24. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93344, 88 Stat. 297 (1974).
25. Id. at § 2.
26. Id. at § 102.
27. Leachman et. al., supra note 11, at 32.
28. J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 6, at 2.
29. 26 I.R.C. § 415 (2012) (providing for dollar limitations on benefits and
contributions under qualified retirement plans). For example, the limitation for
defined contribution plans under I.R.C. § 415(c)(1)(A) was $52,000 in 2014. See IRS
Announces 2014 Pension Plan Limitations; Taxpayers May Contribute up to $17,500
to Their 401(k) Plans in 2014, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (Oct. 31, 2013),
http://www.irs.gov/uac/IRS-Announces-2014-Pension-Plan-Limitations%3BTaxpayers-May-Contribute-up-to-$17,500-to-their-401(k)-plans-in-2014.

GHILARDUCCIFINAL (1) (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

6/2/2016 7:54 AM

RETIREMENT DEDUCTIONS INTO TAX CREDITS

95

“Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 20142018,” begins with the baseline that all compensation to
employees is subject to ordinary income tax.30 The revenue that
would have been collected—if the tax code did not specifically
exclude the income—is the tax expenditure.31 Specific exclusions
for employer-provided benefits include coverage under disability
and health insurance and group-term life insurance, among many
others. Each exclusion is classified as a tax expenditure in the
annual reports.32 However, treatment of employer contributions
to pension plans, income earned on pension assets, and worker
contributions to DC plans and IRAs are deferred.33 The federal
(and some states’) tax codes allow employer contributions to
qualified pension plans, and require that employee contributions
are not to be taxed until distributed to the employee (either before
or at retirement).34 The JCT Report elaborates that “[t]he tax
expenditure for ‘net exclusion of pension contributions and
earnings’ is computed as the income taxes forgone on current taxexcluded pension contributions and earnings less the income
taxes paid on current pension distributions (including the 10percent additional tax paid on early withdrawals from pension
plans).”35
Tax expenditures for DB and DC plans that had been in place
for years showed a larger rate of increase in 1983; the same year
in which Congress and President Ronald Reagan not only raised
the FICA tax, but also cut future Social Security benefits at each
eligible age of collection by gradually raising the “normal
retirement age” from sixty five to sixty seven.36 The expansion of
tax expenditures through exclusions goes against wellestablished public finance principles that, all things being equal,
an efficient tax code is one that expands the tax base and keeps
tax rates low. This is because high tax rates produce distortions
in prices and behavior.37 But, exclusions and deductions work in
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 6, at 10.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id. (JCT does not take into account any behavioral changes or other tax
consequences that might happen if special tax treatment did not exist).
36. See John A. Svahn & Mary Ross, Social Security Amendments of 1983:
Legislative History and Summary of Provisions, 46 SOC. SECURITY BULL., no. 7, July
1983, at 3, 12.
37. RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE 49 (Bonnie E. Lieberman & James B. Armstrong eds., 3d ed. 1980); see
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the opposite direction: they narrow the tax base and, thus, require
higher tax rates to keep revenue constant.38
One unfortunate consequence of using tax deductions as a
lever to induce socially acceptable behavior—behavior that
advances the goals of social policy—is that the progressive income
tax system produces an upside-down distribution of subsidies.
That is, rather than steer subsidies to the households in need of
the most help and that are the most sensitive to the
encouragement, the greater subsidies go to the households with a
higher marginal tax rate.39 Further, households with high
marginal tax rates consist of taxpayers in higher brackets who
can afford to defer more consumption until retirement (and are in
less need of the incentive or financial help from the government)
than households in the lower tax brackets. The more a taxpayer
saves, and the higher the tax bracket under which that taxpayer
falls, the greater the subsidy from a federal and state deferral of
taxes on retirement plan contributions, and the greater the
buildup in those funds. Not everyone agrees that the upside-down
nature of the subsidies is a problem. The Employee Benefit
Research Institute (EBRI) provides a technical explanation that
the taxpayers with the highest incomes derive the greatest
benefits because the benefit is proportionate to their income and
effort.40
Here is a simplified example of how the tax deferral works as
a subsidy: let us imagine the case of a barista who earns $1,000
per month and who faces a (hypothetical) marginal tax rate of
12%. Our barista would pay $120 in taxes, which means she is
left with $880 of after-tax income. If, instead, she contributes
$100 to a qualified retirement plan, her taxable income would be
lower, at $900. With only $108 due in taxes now, our barista
would be left with less after-tax-income—$792 versus $880—but
she will also have $100 in a retirement plan and will have saved
generally Batchelder et al., supra note 21, at 48.
38. Andrew Chamberlain & Patrick Fleenor, America’s Shrinking Income Tax
Base Requires Higher Rates for Everyone, TAX FOUNDATION (Sept. 21, 2005),
http://www.taxfoundation.org/article/americas-shrinking-income-tax-base-requireshigher-rates-everyone.
39. This assertion is merely mathematical. A person who deducts 1 dollar of
qualified spending and is at a 39% marginal tax rate is allowed to not pay 39 cents in
taxes they otherwise would owe. But a person in a 15% tax bracket is only allowed to
not pay 15 cents in taxes otherwise owed. The person in the highest bracket gets the
largest tax break. The regressive nature of the subsidy is upside down. See Fast Facts:
Are 401(k) Tax Preferences Upside Down?, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE
(Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.ebri.org/pdf/FF.244.Up-Down.29Aug131.pdf.
40. Id.
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$12 on her tax bill. Whatever investment gains are made on her
retirement account would also be tax free.41 Moreover, when our
barista collects the money for retirement in the future, her income
will be taxed at a rate presumably lower than 12%.42 This is the
case because, by and large, retirees earn less income and thus,
face a lower tax liability than they did during their years of
employment.43 If we assume a case of zero growth, and a lower
tax rate at retirement, our barista’s initial $100 contribution
would pay a tax of $6. This leaves her with a larger net worth (of
$886) than she would otherwise have without contributing to a
retirement account ($880).44
B. SIZE OF FEDERAL RETIREMENT TAX EXPENDITURES
Retirement tax expenditures are among the three largest
federal tax expenditures.45 Total federal retirement plan tax
expenditures were $94.6 billion in 2014, with spending on DC
plans, such as 401(k) plans, making up the largest share.46 The
costs of these tax subsidies are also projected to increase such
that, between 2014 and 2018, the federal cost of retirement tax
expenditures is projected to be $805.1 billion (see Table 1).47

41. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 1, at 220-21.
42. See Teresa Ghilarducci & Adam Hayes, 401(k) Tax Policy Creates Inequality,
SCHWARTZ
CTR.
FOR
ECON.
POLICY
ANALYSIS
(2015),
http://www.economicpolicyresearch.org/images/docs/research/retirement_security/Ha
yes_Ghilarducci_Policy_Note_1.9.15_FINAL.pdf
43. See Ghilarducci et al., supra note 7, at 1-2, 17.
44. See id.
45. See generally J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 6, at 36.
46. In 2014, defined contribution plans accounted for 47% of the total cost of all
tax expenditures; define benefit plans 28%, traditional IRAs 13%, Keogh plans 6%,
Roth IRAs 5%, and special credits 1%. See id.
47. We are reporting low estimates of the tax expenditure. Please see the
appendix for a discussion of the range of estimates based on different methodologies
and assumptions.
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TABLE 1. FEDERAL RETIREMENT TAX EXPENDITURES (IN
BILLIONS)48

Function

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

Keogh Plans
DB Plans
DC Plans
Traditional
IRAs
Roth IRAs
Special
Credits
Total

5.8
26.0
44.9
11.8

8.7
41.3
62.3
12.8

10.0
50.4
81.2
13.9

11.4
61.2
98.9
15.0

16.2
69.4
111.7
16.0

20142018
52.1
248.3
399.0
69.5

4.9
1.2

5.5
1.2

6.1
1.2

6.6
1.2

7.2
1.2

30.2
6.0

94.6

131.8

162.8

194.3

222.1

805.1

Table 1, above, provides a breakdown of the cost of retirement
expenditures by type and year. Of the total cost of retirement tax
expenditures in 2014, $5.8 billion accounted for preferential
treatment to plans covering partners and sole proprietors (e.g.,
Keogh Plans), $26.0 billion for the more traditional DB plans,
$44.9 billion for DC plans, and almost $17 billion for both
traditional and Roth IRAs combined. With additional credits for
certain elective deferrals and IRA contributions (special credits)
making up more than $1 billion in 2014, the total cost of
retirement tax expenditures amounted to $94.6 billion in 2014.
This amount, as can be seen above, is projected to increase every
year—to reach $222.1 billion by 2018.
Leveraging the tax code to achieve social goals escapes the
scrutiny of annual evaluation. Unlike discretionary spending,
revenue losses from the tax breaks are rarely debated. There is a
built-in tendency for tax expenditure subsidies to grow without
review or accountability, which is a constant theme of the
Government Accountability Office (GAO), the government’s
neutral accounting and auditing agency.49 As part of the annual
budgeting cycle in Congress, the United States House of
Representatives Committee on Appropriations (Appropriations
Committee) considers funding for all types of discretionary

48. J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 6, at 32.
49. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,

GAO-05-690, GOVERNMENT
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY: TAX EXPENDITURES REPRESENT A SUBSTANTIAL
FEDERAL COMMITMENT AND NEED TO BE REEXAMINED 18 (Sept. 2005).
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spending; but, tax expenditures, mandatory spending, and net
interest payments are not reviewed during the annual budget
process.50 In this sense, tax expenditures are entitlements
because they do not end automatically, and, rather, it is the
number and intensity of tax units who participate in the preferred
activity that ultimately determines the amount of spending, just
like with Social Security and Medicare.51
The government’s large and indirect, but real, effect in
boosting household savings is starkly appreciated when
comparing the size of the tax expenditure for retirement savings
to actual savings. Federal tax expenditures for pensions and
retirement accounts as a share of personal savings has risen
sharply since 1974 and has remained in the 16% to 20% range for
the past fifty years.52 To illustrate, the ratio of the retirement tax
expenditure to personal savings was 5% in 1974, 21% in 1984,
20% in 2004, and 16% in 2011 (see Figure 1).53 When we add state
tax expenditures for retirement savings ($20 billion in 2014), the
total amount of tax expenditures in 2014 ($114 billion) amounted
to more than one-sixth of total savings—$633 billion in 2014.54
Yet, the savings rate, which is the ratio of savings to personal
income, has not been enhanced by this growing rate of tax
expenditures. Instead, it has decreased; in 1974, the savings rate
was 12.9%, in 1994, it was 6.3%, and in 2014 it was 4.9%.55

50. See Sima J. Gandhi, Audit the Tax Code: Doing What Works for Tax
Expenditures,
CTR.
FOR
AM.
PROGRESS
5
(Apr.
2010),
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/issues/2010/04/pdf/dww_tax_framing.pdf.
51. Because tax expenditures resemble mandatory spending in this sense, they
have often being called “the hidden entitlements.” See Tax Expenditures – The Hidden
Entitlements,
CITIZENS
FOR
TAX
JUSTICE
1-2
(May
1996),
http://www.ctj.org/pdf/hident.pdf.
52. See Personal Saving, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, ECON. RES. FED. RES.
BANK
OF
ST.
LOUIS
(2015),
https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/A071RC1A027NBEA.
53. See id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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FIGURE 1. TAX EXPENDITURES FOR RETIREMENT SAVINGS AS A
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL PERSONAL SAVINGS, 1974-201156
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Figure 1 shows the sharp increase in the cost of retirement
tax expenditures expressed as a share of total personal savings.
By 1984, the cost of retirement expenditures—as a share of total
personal savings—was four times that of the cost in the 1970s.
The cost of retirement tax expenditures has remained within the
16% to 20% range of all personal savings since this sharp rise of
the 1980s. As this chart aptly illustrates, the government is a
major partner in household savings.
C. STATE LEVEL EXPENDITURES FOR RETIREMENT
Because the cost of tax expenditures are most often opaque,
we doubt many governors, treasurers, and legislators realize the
extent of the losses to the state treasuries that exist from adopting
the federal tax provisions. State tax expenditures, resulting from

56. See generally Interactive Data, U.S. DEP’T OF COM., BUREAU OF ECON.
ANALYSIS, http://www.bea.gov/itable/index.cfm (last visited Jan. 5, 2016) [hereinafter
BEA] (for JCT 2011 and NIPA accounts from the BEA). See also STAFF OF J. COMM.
ON TAXATION, JCX-15-11, BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS
AND HISTORICAL SURVEY OF TAX EXPENDITURE ESTIMATES: SCHEDULED FOR PUB.
HEARING BEFORE S. COMM. ON FIN. MAR. 1, 2011 20-25(2011).
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conformity with federal tax law, are called “implicit tax
expenditures.”57 Since states often piggyback on federal tax
provisions for administrative simplicity, for retirement
preferential treatment alone, we estimate that they forgo nearly
$20 billion of revenue each year.58
In 2014, the largest states incurred the highest tax
expenditures. California and New York led the pack with $5.2
billion and $2.8 billion tax expenditures in annual tax revenues.
And, both Pennsylvania and Massachusetts forgo more than $1
billion dollars each year in revenue due to the costs of their
retirement expenditures (see Table 2).59
TABLE 2. RETIREMENT TAX EXPENDITURES, NATIONAL AND
STATE (2014)60

State
United States (Federal)
All States
Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana

Total Tax Retirement Account
Expenditure (2014)
$94,600,000,000
$19,910,797,336
$112,785,823
$121,002,756
$51,800,446
$5,170,000,000
$209,132,532
$205,397,511
$35,398,530
$711,000,000
$80,737,496
$45,988,492
$498,959,734
$152,352,803

57. Leachman et. al., supra note 11, at 14.
58. See Ghilarducci et al., supra note 7, at 1-2.
59. States without an income tax are Alaska, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota,
Texas, Washington, and Wyoming. New Hampshire and Tennessee collect an income
tax, which applies to interest and dividend income only. The appendix describes the
calculation methodology. See id. at 3. See also Chris Kahn, State with No Income Tax:
Better or Worse?, BANKRATE.COM, http://www.bankrate.com/finance/taxes/state-withno-income-tax-better-or-worse-1.aspx (last visited Jan. 3, 2016).
60. Calculations are based on individual state tax expenditure reports and
developed estimates. See infra Appendix for details.
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Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
West Virginia
Wisconsin
District of Columbia

$520,000,000
$78,363,652
$539,000,000
$92,289,333
$162,000,000
$293,558,700
$1,060,000,000
$946,000,000
$881,000,000
$48,414,308
$151,229,468
$159,000,000
$114,446,275
$350,615,243
$32,187,460
$2,826,000,000
$914,000,000
$15,627,995
$256,043,750
$63,555,342
$411,000,000
$1,100,300,000
$41,846,348
$121,189,494
$92,421,733
$37,829,036
$303,532,120
$47,690,959
$730,100,000
$127,000,000

Table 2 provides the total cost of retirement tax expenditures
at the state and federal levels. This Study is the first to measure
the tax expenditures for retirement accounts for all states in the
United States (including Washington, D.C.) that have an income
tax on earnings. Table 2 shows that, in aggregate, states spend
nearly $20 billion in preferential treatment for qualified
retirement accounts. Eleven states, of the forty-two listed above,
forgo more than half-a-billion dollars each in revenue as a result
of this preferential treatment.
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RETIREMENT TAX EXPENDITURES ARE BOTH
INEFFECTIVE IN RAISING RETIREMENT SAVINGS
AND HIGHLY REGRESSIVE

Tax subsidies for retirement accounts are intended to cajole
individuals to save for retirement tomorrow, rather than to
consume today.61 But, experts have concluded that deductions for
retirement plans are not effective in encouraging workers or
households to save more.62 Retirement tax expenditures are
regressive and largely ineffective because access to retirement
plans is skewed towards those at the higher-income brackets.63
Almost one-half (47%) of workers in the United States between
the ages of twenty five and sixty four are not offered a retirement
plan at work, and access to an employer-sponsored retirement
plan varies considerably by income and industry; with the higher
rates of access found in high-income occupations, including those
in finance, insurance, and real estate.64
Evidence shows that higher-income families respond to the
preferential tax treatment by shifting assets from taxable
accounts to non-taxable retirement accounts in order to lower
their taxes.65 Their savings levels are not affected.66 Low- and
middle-income families, least prepared for retirement, have tax
rates that are too low to effectively induce them to save more.67
This reality is compounded by the fact that retirement tax
expenditures are highly regressive;68 a $100 deduction typically
61. GHILARDUCCI, supra note 22, at 162.
62. See Raj Chetty et al., Active vs. Passive Decisions and Crowdout in Retirement
Savings Accounts: Evidence from Denmark 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 18565, 2012), https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/getFile.aspx.
See also Orazio P. Attanasio & Thomas DeLeire, The Effect of Individual Retirement
Accounts on Household Consumption and National Saving, 112 ECON. J. 504, 505
(2002); William G. Gale & John Karl Scholz, IRAs and Household Saving, 84 AM.
ECON. REV. 1233, 1233-34 (1994).
63. Gale & Scholz, supra note 62, at 1234-35.
64. Saad-Lessler et al., supra note 14, at 4-6 (finding that workers’ declining
bargaining power, along with decreasing firm sizes, serve as the largest factors in the
drop in sponsorship rates from 61 percent in 1999 to 53 percent in 2011).
65. Chetty et al., supra note 62, at 3, 9, 31.
66. People who do not pay taxes are not eligible for a tax deduction or tax deferral.
Only if the tax subsidies were in the form of a refundable tax credit would these
households receive a tax subsidy.
67. Leonard E. Burman et al., Distributional Effects of Defined Contribution
Plans and Individual Retirement Arrangements, 57 NAT’L TAX J. 671, 684 (2004).
68. Ghilarducci et al., supra note 7, at 4.
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saves $39.60 for someone in the top income-tax bracket, which is
39.6%, but only $10 for a low-income worker in the 10% bracket.
The bottom two quintiles (40%) of the income distribution receive
only 3% of the tax subsidies for employer-sponsored retirement
plans.69 In similar fashion, 60% of tax subsidies for employerbased retirement savings and IRAs go to taxpayers in the top
quintile (20%) of the income distribution.70
The regressivity of tax expenditures also compounds each
year. All individuals benefit from tax-free accrual, but the highertax-bracket worker generates investment earnings on a larger
initial contribution and tax break—the tax break is worth 39.6
cents on the dollar, compared to a low-wage barista who gets a tax
break of less than 15 cents because she is in a lower tax bracket.
And, if the tax savings are plowed back into the account, higherincome workers benefit from even larger tax subsidies.71
For these and other reasons, experts and the GAO have
called for periodic and systematic reviews of federal tax
expenditures to inform policy decisions about their efficiency,
effectiveness, and equity.72
IV.

CONVERT RETIREMENT DEDUCTIONS AND
DEFERRALS TO CREDITS THAT CAN BE DIRECTLY
DEPOSITED IN GUARANTEED RETIREMENT
ACCOUNTS

If the 2014 retirement tax deferrals were converted to
refundable tax credits in a revenue-neutral way, all U.S. workers
would receive an $819 deposit into a retirement account from
their federal and state governments—if the state has an income

69. Batchelder et al., supra note 21, at 54.
70. See C. Eugene Steuerle et al., Who Benefits from Asset-Building Tax
Subsidies?,
URB.
INST.
(Sept.
24,
2014),
http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/413241-WhoBenefits-from-Asset-Building-Tax-Subsidies-.PDF.; see generally CONG. BUDGET
OFFICE, PUB. NO. 4308, THE DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR TAX EXPENDITURES IN THE
INDIVIDUAL
INCOME
TAX
SYSTEM
(2013),
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43768_
DistributionTaxExpenditures.pdf.
71. See Ghilarducci et al., supra note 7, at 2-4.
72. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 49, at 48. Some states, like
California, have begun to provide information on the purpose and cost of some tax
expenditures but the scope of these reports remain limited, and very few states are
following suit. See Leachman et. al., supra note 11, at 45-47; see also Gandhi, supra
note 50, at 9.
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tax on earnings.73 This automatic deposit through a refundable
tax credit would have a larger and more significant impact on
total savings than policies that rely upon individuals to take
specific steps to increase their own retirement savings.74 A refund
is more progressive than a deduction because refundable credits
do not increase with a taxpayer’s marginal tax rate.75
Transforming the deduction to a refundable tax credit would
provide 87.8 million workers nationwide, who do not participate
in a retirement plan at work, with a credit of $647.76 More than
68 million of these workers are in states with an income tax (see
Table 3). As such, these workers’ federal credits would be
supplemented with an average state credit of $172, which would
be deposited into their retirement savings accounts (see Table
3).77
TABLE 3. NUMBER OF BENEFICIARIES OF REFUNDABLE TAX
CREDITS, NATIONAL AND STATE (2014)78

State

United States (National)
Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut

Workers Who Do Not
Participate in an Employer
Retirement Account
87,783,000
1,161,452
1,882,631
796,525
11,051,443
1,548,600
975,150

73. This amount represents the sum of the federal tax expenditure per worker
($647) and the state tax expenditure per worker ($172). Workers in states that do not
collect an income tax on earnings would only be eligible for a credit from the federal
level, while those from states with an income tax on earnings would receive the sum
of the federal and state tax expenditure as a credit. See Ghilarducci et al., supra note
7, at 4.
74. See Chetty et al., supra note 62, at 4.
75. See Eric Toder & Daniel Baneman, Distributional Effects of Individual
Income Tax Expenditures: An Update 6 (Urban Inst. & Brookings Inst., Tax Pol’y Ctr.,
Working Paper, 2012), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412495Distribution-of-Tax-Expenditures.pdf.
76. See Ghilarducci et al., supra note 7, at 4.
77. Id. at 4-5, 13.
78. Id. at 5 (Table 3).
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Delaware
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
West Virginia
Wisconsin
District of Columbia

251,340
2,587,337
347,076
452,855
3,521,499
1,711,644
880,627
818,203
1,150,307
1,311,329
388,252
1,528,903
1,871,068
2,617,841
1,509,685
728,207
1,690,669
311,404
578,024
2,433,660
612,203
5,307,365
2,747,885
231,292
3,159,542
1,048,392
1,088,922
3,358,076
291,700
1,223,594
846,416
199,230
2,213,049
398,006
1,588,315
175,737

Table 3 shows the total number of workers, at the state and
federal levels that would benefit from a refundable credit for
retirement. In more than half (twenty-four) of the forty two states
listed, one million workers (or more) who do not participate in a
retirement plan at work stand to benefit from a retirement credit.
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In large states like California, this figure rises to eleven million
workers, while five million workers would benefit in New York.
One example of how the refundable tax credits will help
workers save can be illustrated in the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, where the combined refundable tax credit (state
and federal) will amount to $964 (see Table 8). All workers in the
state of Massachusetts would have this combined credit directly
and annually deposited into their retirement accounts. If we fastforward the same reinvestment process for forty working years
and assume an annualized rate of return of 2%, the average
worker in Massachusetts who does not participate in a retirement
plan will have saved more than $58,000 by 2054. This figure is
higher than the median account balance of a near-retiree today
who has access to an IRA or 401(k) plan at work.79
In a second example, a worker from the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania would have a combined refundable credit of $830.
If we fast-forward the same yearly process of reinvestment as
above for forty working years, and apply a more advantageous
annual return of 5%, the average worker in Pennsylvania who
starts with no savings will have saved approximately $100,264 by
2054. This same exercise can be performed with each of the forty
two states (including Washington, D.C.) with an income tax on
earnings.
The uniform refundable tax credits we propose in this Study
should be part of a comprehensive retirement and savings reform
that includes the creation of new, low-cost savings vehicles.
Guaranteed Retirement Accounts (GRAs), as advocated by
Ghilarducci in previous writings, could be such a vehicle.80 GRAs
are “individual, ‘cash-balance’ accounts, where benefits at
retirement are based solely on contributions and returns.”81
Additionally, GRAs would guarantee a rate of return above
inflation to protect workers from the volatility of the stock market,
and “[a]ll individual account assets would be invested together in
one large pool, with an emphasis on low-risk, long-term gains.”82
Individual employees and the government could also fund GRAs
by having the refundable credits directly deposited into workers’

79. See Joelle Saad-Lessler et al., supra note 14, at 13-14.
80. Teresa Ghilarducci et al., State Guaranteed Retirement Accounts: A Low-Cost,
Secure Solution to America’s Retirement Crisis, DEMOS & SCHWARTZ CTR. FOR ECON.
POLICY
ANALYSIS
3
(Nov.
2012),
http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/StateGRAReport-1.pdf.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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savings accounts.83 At no extra cost to employers, the state, or the
federal government, these reforms, GRAs and refundable tax
credits combined, will expand the reach of a secure and dignified
retirement for all workers.84
V.

CONCLUSION

Tax breaks for retirement savings accounts made up the
third largest federal tax expenditure in 2014.85 These tax breaks
also cause substantial, but opaque, losses to state treasuries. In
this Study, we have estimated and assembled the costs of
retirement tax expenditures at the state level. The loss is of
nearly $20 billion per year.
Transforming retirement tax expenditures into refundable
tax credits at the federal and state levels would lead to more
equitable and expanded retirement security for working- and
middle-class families. These tax credits could be automatically
deposited into workers’ retirement savings GRA accounts. If the
deductions were credits today, more than eighty million workers
nationwide without retirement accounts would have more than
$800 deposited in a retirement savings account. Over forty years,
and assuming an annualized rate of 3.5%, these accounts would
yield over $70,000 per worker. The transition from tax deductions
to refundable tax credits would add no extra costs to the budget
of employers, the states, or the federal government. However,
such a reform would finally make real the promise of a secure
retirement for all workers in the United States.
APPENDIX: METHODOLOGY OF COMPUTING STATE TAX
EXPENDITURES
This Study uses the Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures
for Fiscal Years 2014-2018 report (JCT Report),86 prepared by the
Joint Committee on Taxation, as its baseline for categorizing and
calculating state tax expenditures on retirement. This Study also
uses provisions in federal tax legislation, enacted up to June 30,
2014.87 The JCT Report notes that, a tax expenditure is
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 16.
Id.
J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 6, at 21, 32.
See generally id.
Id. at 1
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calculated by the difference between current law tax liability and
that which would result if the provision were revoked, which
allows taxpayers to benefit from any of the remaining provisions
applicable to the income or expenses associated with the revoked
tax expenditure.88
The Treasury’s Office of Management of the Budget (OMB)
also releases tax expenditure estimates each year.89 Due to
disparate assumptions and methodology, OMB estimates are
larger than those released by the JCT ($146.4 billion versus $94.6
billion, respectively).90 This Study uses JCT estimates. The
difference between retirement tax expenditure estimates released
by the OMB and the JCT is discussed further in previous work by
Teresa Ghilarducci,91 and in Part I of the JCT report, under the
heading, “Comparisons with Treasury.”92
The OMB also reports discounted present-value estimations,
which are treated as more accurately reflecting the true economic
cost of tax provisions.93 The total present-value estimate for
retirement tax expenditures in the OMB report is $101.3 billion.94
This figure “represents the revenue effects, net of future tax
payments, which follow from activities undertaken during
calendar year 2014 which cause the deferrals.”95 For example,
pension contribution in 2014 would cause a deferral of tax
payments on wages in the same year. Such deferrals would also
be on pension fund earnings on these contributions in later years.
When the worker retires, these same 2014 pension contributions
and accrued earnings will be distributed to workers and taxes on
these amounts will be due. These additional taxes are included
in the OMB’s $101.3 billion estimate,96 and explain the higher tax
expenditure number reached by the OMB compared to that
calculated by the JCT.
We use the lower number presented by the JCT ($94.6
88. Id. at 13.
89. See generally OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 1.
90. Compare OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 1, at 226, with Ghilarducci
et al., supra note 7, at 1.
91. See Teresa Ghilarducci, Calculating Retirement Tax Expenditures: 2010,
SCHWARTZ
CTR.
FOR
ECON.
POLICY
ANALYSIS
(2011),
http://www.economicpolicyresearch.org/images/docs/retirement_security_background/
Calculating_Retirement_Tax_Expenditures.pdf.
92. J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 6, at 13-14.
93. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 1, at 243.
94. See id.
95. See Ghilarducci et al., supra note 7, at 7.
96. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 1, at 220.
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billion) so as to not exaggerate the revenue losses. We use this
number under the understanding that the individual state tax
expenditure reports we examine provide cash-based, not presentvalue, estimates.97 Because this figure is lower than both OMB
estimates (the cash-based and present-values), our Study may
actually underestimate the true cost of retirement tax
expenditures.
Retirement tax expenditures in the JCT Report fall under the
following main categories: “Net exclusion of pension contributions
and earnings,” “Individual retirement arrangements,” and
“Credit for certain individuals for elective deferrals and IRA
contributions.” The net exclusion of pension contributions and
earnings category consists of plans covering partners and sole
proprietors, DB plans, and DC plans. Among the individual
retirement arrangements category are listed traditional IRAs and
Roth IRAs.98
A. DERIVING ESTIMATES FOR STATES THAT PUBLISH TAX
EXPENDITURE REPORTS
The state figures for retirement tax expenditures are
calculated using the tax expenditure reports released by each
state.99 Forty-two states (including Washington, D.C.) have an
earnings income tax.100 The states of New Hampshire and
97.
98.
99.
100.

See generally J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 6.
Id. at 32.
Ghilarducci et al., supra note 7, at 7.
Id. The following illustrate the authors’ investigations of each state report
and the computation of a census:
See CAL. DEP’T. OF FIN., TAX EXPENDITURE REPORT 2014-15 (2015); D.C. OFF. OF
REVENUE ANALYSIS, D.C. TAX EXPENDITURE REP. (May 2014); GA. DEP’T. OF AUDITS &
ACCTS., GEORGIA TAX EXPENDITURE REPORT FOR FY 2016 (Dec. 2014); IOWA DEP’T. OF
REVENUE, 2010 IOWA TAX EXPENDITURE STUDY: FINAL RELEASE (Nov. 2014); KY.
GOVERNOR’S OFFICE FOR ECON. ANALYSIS: OFFICE OF THE STATE BUDGET DIR., TAX
EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS, FISCAL YEARS 2014-2016 (2014); DEP’T. OF ADMIN. & FIN.
SERVS., ME. REVENUE SERVS., OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, MAINE STATE TAX EXPENDITURE
REPORT 2014-2015 (2013); EXEC. OFFICE FOR ADMIN. & FIN., COMMONWEALTH OF
MASS., TAX EXPENDITURE BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2015 (Jan. 2014); MICH. DEP’T. OF
TREASURY, EXECUTIVE BUDGET APPENDIX ON TAX CREDITS, DEDUCTIONS, AND
EXEMPTIONS, FISCAL YEARS 2014 AND 2015 (2014); MINN. DEP’T. OF REVENUE, TAX
RESEARCH DIV., STATE OF MINNESOTA TAX EXPENDITURE BUDGET, FISCAL YEARS 20142017 (Feb. 2014); MONT. DEP’T. OF REVENUE, BIENNIAL REPORT, JULY 1, 2012-JUNE 30,
2014 (2014); N.Y DIV. OF THE BUDGET, DEP’T OF TAXATION & FIN., FY 2016 ANNUAL
REPORT ON NEW YORK STATE TAX EXPENDITURES (2014); N.C. DEP’T. OF REVENUE,
REVENUE RESEARCH DIV., NORTH CAROLINA BIENNIAL TAX EXPENDITURE REPORT
(Dec. 2013); OR. DEP’T. OF ADMIN. SERVS., STATE OF OREGON TAX EXPENDITURE
REPORT 2015-2017 (2015); PA. OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, 2015-2016 PENNSYLVANIA

GHILARDUCCIFINAL (1) (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

6/2/2016 7:54 AM

RETIREMENT DEDUCTIONS INTO TAX CREDITS

111

Tennessee collect an income tax that applies to interest and
dividend income only.101 Of the seven states that do not collect an
income tax, two states (Texas and Florida) are very large in
geographical size, one state (Washington) is medium in
geographical size, and the remaining three (Nevada, South
Dakota, Wyoming) are very small—but only in terms of
population size.102
Of the forty two states that collect an income tax on earnings,
thirty nine publish a tax expenditure report.103 Of these thirty
nine states (including Washington, D.C.), only eighteen estimate
costs of the tax preference for “tax-qualified retirement
accounts.”104
There are obvious differences—size, region,
politically Democratic or Republican—between these three
groups of states. Less obvious, but very important, differences
also exist: (1) states (three in total) that collect an income tax, and
that presumably allow for deductions and exclusions, but do not
publish a tax expenditure report; (2) states (twenty one, in total)
that account for the cost of total tax expenditures in reports, but
offer no details on retirement expenditures; and (3) states
(eighteen, in total)105 that publish the cost of retirement account
preferential treatments.106 Further study on these groups would
have to determine whether the eighteen states that do publish
reports of cost estimates are more sophisticated, careful,
transparent, and exhibit other characteristics of good
government.107
We make the distinction among the three groups of states
here only to further distinguish between states for which we
estimated tax expenditures and those for which we report their
estimates. Of the eighteen states that report retirement tax
expenditures, we estimate tax expenditure values for Kansas,
EXECUTIVE BUDGET (2015); R.I. DEPT. OF REVENUE, OFFICE OF REVENUE ANALYSIS,
2014 TAX EXPENDITURES REPORT (May 15, 2014); WIS. DEP’T. OF REVENUE & DEP’T OF
ADMIN., STATE OF WISCONSIN SUMMARY OF TAX EXEMPTION DEVICES (Feb. 2013).
101. Ghilarducci et al., supra note 7, at 17.
102. See generally id., supra note 7.
103. Id. at 8.
104. Id.
105. The 18 states that publish a tax expenditure report for retirement accounts
include: California, District of Columbia, Georgia, Montana, Nebraska, Iowa, Kansas,
Pennsylvania, Kentucky, Rhode Island, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, and Wisconsin. Id.
106. Id.
107. See Full- and Part-Time Legislatures, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS. (June 1,
2014), available at http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/full-andpart-time-legislatures.aspx.
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Mississippi, and Rhode Island. Kansas, for example, “does not
publish estimates for net exclusions of private pension
contributions and earnings.”108
Additionally, the state of
Mississippi does not provide estimates with respect to
contributions to employee pension plans.109 Rhode Island, for its
part, does not specify whether it includes “deferred earnings from
retirement plans and contributions to public pensions or private
[DB] plans.”110 The final fifteen states we find with reliable tax
expenditure calculations are: California, District of Columbia,
Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Montana, New York, North Carolina, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.
Not all of the above fifteen states provide complete estimates
of retirement tax expenditures in their reports.111 Each state
provides distinct categories that are not comparable.
Pennsylvania, for example, only provides estimates for employermade retirement contributions.112 Additionally, Massachusetts
provides estimates for deductions of employee contributions to
public pension plans, but listed as part of the total under the
category of “Deduction for Employee Social Security and Railroad
Retirement Payments.”113 Since this combined estimate would
have overstated the cost of retirement tax expenditures for
Massachusetts, deductions of employee contributions to public
pensions were left out of our calculation. The bottom line is that,
where we have had to make a judgment call for the purposes of
this article, we erred on the side of underreporting.
B. ESTIMATING RETIREMENT TAX EXPENDITURES PER
WORKER FOR STATES THAT DO NOT PUBLISH ESTIMATES
Importantly, “[t]he majority of states do not report lost
revenue from favoring activities in the tax code.”114 In this
subpart, we provide estimates for the remaining twenty seven
states that collect an income tax on earnings, but that do not
publish reliable estimates.115
108. This is the author’s own count and analysis of the state reports. See
Ghilarducci et al., supra note 7, at 8.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See Ghilarducci et al., supra note 7, at 8.
115. We follow the methodology used by authors in the following source: Lauren
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We begin by calculating the mean contribution an average
worker makes to their private account (see Table 4). Here, we also
make the assumption that the typical employer contributes 2.1%
of each worker’s pay, while the typical worker contributes 6% of
their salary.116
TABLE 4. ESTIMATED AVERAGE CONTRIBUTION PER WORKER
IN 2014117

State

Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Kansas

Annual
Mean
Wage
(2014)
$40,879
$45,075
$37,933
$49,727
$55,274
$50,042
$46,141
$39,457
$48,437
$41,428
$41,895

Estimated
Employee
Contribution

Estimated
Employer
Contribution

Estimated
Contribution
Per Worker*

6.0%
6.0%
6.0%
6.0%
6.0%
6.0%
6.0%
6.0%
6.0%
6.0%
6.0%

2.1%
2.1%
2.1%
2.1%
2.1%
2.1%
2.1%
2.1%
2.1%
2.1%
2.1%

$3,311
$3,651
$3,073
$4,028
$4,477
$4,053
$3,737
$3,196
$3,923
$3,356
$3,393

Schmitz & Teresa Ghilarducci, New York City and State Tax Expenditures for Defined
Contribution Plans (Schwartz Ctr. for Econ. Policy Analysis, Working Paper No. 20122,
2012),
http://www.economicpolicyresearch.org/images/docs/research/retirement_security/WP
%202012-2%20Lauren%20Schmitz.pdf. See generally id. at 1-2 (providing “Executive
Summary” of authors’ estimates for those states that do not publish dependable
estimates).
116. See ALICIA H. MUNNELL & ANNIKA SUDÉN, COMING UP SHORT: THE
CHALLENGE OF 401(K) PLANS 29-31, 58-61 (2004); see also David Wray, 401(k) Sponsors
Increase Focus on Plan Investments, PLAN SPONSOR COUNCIL OF AM. (Sept. 16, 2010),
http://www.psca.org/401-k-sponsors-increase-focus-on-plan-investments.
117. Ghilarducci et al., supra note 7, at 9 (2014 annual mean wage calculated using
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) 2013 State Occupational Employment and Wage
Estimates. Those estimates were converted into 2014 dollars with BLS Consumer
Price Index (CPI) data. States are listed in alphabetical order.). See Occupational
Employment Statistics, May 2014 State Occupational Employment and Wage
Estimates,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
LAB.,
BUREAU
OF
LAB.
STATS.,
http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oessrcst.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2016); see also CPI
Detailed Report, Data for January 2015, U.S. Dep’t. of Lab., Bureau of Lab. Stats.,
www.bls.gov/cpi/cpid1501.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2016).
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Louisiana
$40,137 6.0%
2.1%
$3,251
Maryland
$53,689 6.0%
2.1%
$,349
Mississippi $36,643 6.0%
2.1%
$2,968
Missouri
$42,687 6.0%
2.1%
$3,458
Nebraska
$40,849 6.0%
2.1%
$3,309
New Jersey $53,638 6.0%
2.1%
$4,345
New
$42,129 6.0%
2.1%
$3,412
Mexico
North
$43,083 6.0%
2.1%
$3,490
Dakota
Ohio
$43,856 6.0%
2.1%
$3,552
Oklahoma
$40,574 6.0%
2.1%
$3,287
Rhode
$49,595 6.0%
2.1%
$4,017
Island
South
$39,609 6.0%
2.1%
$3,208
Carolina
Utah
$43,419 6.0%
2.1%
$3,517
Vermont
$44,760 6.0%
2.1%
$3,626
Virginia
$50,916 6.0%
2.1%
$4,124
West
$38,146 6.0%
2.1%
$3,090
Virginia
*Product of the sum of both contribution and the annual
mean wage.
Table 4 provides estimates of the average retirement account
contribution per worker in 2014 for states that do not publish
reliable estimates. The estimated contribution per worker is
expressed as a function of each state’s mean wage, the average
employee contribution to a private retirement account, and that
of the employer, as a share of a worker’s pay.
In Table 5 (below), we multiply the derived mean
contributions by the median tax rate for the state. This is done in
order to develop an estimate of the tax expenditure per employee
or worker.
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TABLE 5. 2014 ESTIMATED RETIREMENT TAX EXPENDITURE
PER WORKER IN EACH STATE118

State

Estimated
Contribution
Per Worker

Median
Statutory
Tax Rate
(2014)

Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Kansas
Louisiana
Maryland
Mississippi
Missouri
Nebraska
New Jersey
New Mexico
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
West Virginia

$3,311
$3,651
$3,073
$4,028
$4,477
$4,053
$3,737
$3,196
$3,923
$3,356
$3,393
$3,251
$4,349
$2,968
$3,458
$3,309
$4,345
$3,412
$3,490
$3,552
$3,287
$4,017
$3,208
$3,517
$3,626
$4,124
$3,090

4.00%
3.36%
4.00%
4.63%
5.75%
5.00%
7.40%
5.10%
5.00%
3.40%
3.75%
4.00%
4.87%
4.00%
3.75%
8.52%
4.51%
3.95%
2.52%
3.22%
3.00%
4.75%
4.50%
5.00%
7.80%
4.00%
4.50%

Estimated
Retirement
Expenditure
Per Worker
(2014)
$132
$123
$123
$186
$257
$203
$277
$163
$196
$114
$127
$130
$212
$119
$130
$282
$196
$135
$88
$114
$99
$191
$144
$176
$283
$165
$139

Table 5 provides our estimated retirement tax expenditure
per worker for 2014. The states listed above are those that do not
publish reliable estimates of their own. The state retirement tax
118. Ghilarducci et al., supra note 7, at 10.
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expenditure per worker is expressed as a function of the
previously estimated mean contribution per worker in each state
and the state’s median statutory tax rate.
It is important to note that by using the median tax rate, our
figures, by and large, underestimate the per-worker tax
expenditures for retirement. Retirement plan contributions swell
significantly for workers in the highest income brackets.119 Our
undervaluing is evidenced by the fact that, in our calculation, only
three states generate figures larger than what we observed
published in their respective tax expenditure reports.120
In Table 6, we multiply the per-worker tax expenditure for
retirement at the state level by the share of workers in the state
who participate in an employer-provided or employer-sponsored
retirement plan, and further by the total number of workers in
the state in 2014.

TABLE 6. 2014 ESTIMATED TOTAL RETIREMENT TAX
EXPENDITURE PER STATE121

State

Estimated
Retirement
Expenditure
Per Worker
(2014)

2014
Employment
Level
(Annual
Average)

Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware

$132
$123
$123
$186
$257
$203

2,013,000
2,869,000
1,218,000
2,670,000
1,773,000
426,000

Fraction of
Workers
Who
Participate
in an
EmployerSponsored
Retirement
Plan (2012)
0.42
0.34
0.35
0.42
0.45
0.41

Estimated
Total
Retirement
Tax
Expenditure
for 2014

$112,785,823
$121,002,756
$51,800,446
$209,132,532
$205,397,511
$35,398,530

119. Id. at 8.
120. This study ultimately gives priority to estimates derived from tax expenditure
reports in the states that publish them. Id.
121. Participation rates are calculated from March 2013 Current Population
Survey data for U.S. workers. Employment levels per state are from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics. States are listed in alphabetical order. Id. at 11.
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Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Kansas
Louisiana
Maryland
Mississippi
Missouri
Nebraska
New Jersey
New Mexico
North
Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Rhode Island
South
Carolina
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
West
Virginia

117

$277
$163
$196
$114
$127
$130
$212
$119
$130
$282
$196
$135
$88

639,000
735,000
6,065,000
3,047,000
1,434,000
2,021,000
2,915,000
1,136,000
2,857,000
984,000
4,223,000
851,000
409,000

0.46
0.38
0.43
0.44
0.43
0.35
0.48
0.36
0.41
0.41
0.42
0.28
0.43

$80,737,496
$45,988,492
$498,959,734
$152,352,803
$78,363,652
$92,289,333
$293,558,700
$48,414,308
$151,229,468
$114,446,275
$350,615,243
$32,187,460
$15,627,995

$114
$99
$191
$144

5,398,000
1,693,000
511,000
2,063,000

0.41
0.38
0.43
0.41

$256,043,750
$63,555,342
$41,846,348
$121,189,494

$176
$283
$165
$139

1,372,000
333,000
4,053,000
741,000

0.38
0.40
0.45
0.46

$92,421,733
$37,829,036
$303,532,120
$47,690,959

Table 6 provides the estimated total cost, in 2014, of
retirement tax expenditures for states that do not publish
workable and reliable estimates of their own. Total state costs of
retirement tax expenditures are expressed as a function of perworker tax expenditure for retirement in each state, the share of
works in the state who participate in an employer-provided or
employer-sponsored retirement plan, and the total number of
workers in the state for 2014.
C. DERIVING THE REFUNDABLE TAX CREDIT PER WORKER
To generate the per-worker refundable tax credits at the
federal level, we divide the total tax expenditures for retirement
from the JCT report by the yearly average employment level in
the United States in 2014.122

122. Id. at 12.
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Federal Per Worker Retirement Tax Expenditure:
2014 Total Tax Expenditures for Retirement
2014 Annual Level of Employment
$94,600,000,000
146,305,000

= $647

We follow a similar methodology to derive estimates for perworker refundable tax credits at the state level (see Table 8).
Table 7 provides the latest annual figures we had available
for our calculations in this Study:
TABLE 7. ANNUAL DATA UTILIZED TO DERIVE ESTIMATES FOR
STATES123

State

Retirement Tax
Expenditures*

California
New York
Pennsylvania
Georgia
North Carolina
Michigan
Massachusetts
Wisconsin
Minnesota
Kentucky
Oregon
Iowa
Maine
Montana
District of Columbia

FY 2014-2015
FY 2015-2016
FY 2014-2015
2014
FY 2014-2015
FY 2014
FY 2015
2012
FY 2014
FY 2014
FY 2013-2015
2010
FY 2014
FY 2013
FY 2014

Annual
Employment
Statistics
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2012
2014
2014
2014
2010
2014
2013
2014

*All retirement tax expenditure estimates derive from tax expenditure reports
for the listed fiscal years.

For each state, we reviewed the latest tax expenditure
reports available. The annual employment statistics used as
123. Figure used for Oregon is half of the estimate for the 2013-2015 period, given
that Oregon’s tax expenditure report is published every other year. Id.
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denominators in each fraction was determined by the fiscal year
of the report reviewed.
Table 8 illustrates the estimated refundable credit per state.
The average refundable credit at the state level (for all forty-two
states surveyed) is derived by dividing the total tax expenditures
for retirement in all states by the total number of workers in all
states. This calculation yields a mean (state level) refundable tax
credit of $172.
TABLE 8. ESTIMATED REFUNDABLE TAX CREDITS (2014)124

State
National
All States
Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri

State Tax
Expenditures
$94,600,000,000
$19,910,797,336
$112,785,823
$121,002,756
$51,800,446
$5,170,000,000
$209,132,532
$205,397,511
$35,398,530
$711,000,000
$80,737,496
$45,988,492
$498,959,734
$152,352,803
$530,000,000
$78,363,652
$539,000,000
$92,289,333
$162,000,000
$293,558,700
$1,060,000,000
$946,000,000
$881,000,000
$48,414,308
$151,229,468

124. Ghilarducci et al., supra note 7, at 13.

Employment
Level (2014)
146,305,000
115,783,000
2,013,000
2,869,000
1,218,000
17,298,000
2,670,000
1,773,000
426,000
4,371,000
639,000
735,000
6,065,000
3,047,000
1,633,000
1,434,000
1,876,000
2,021,000
656,000
2,915,000
3,349,000
4,408,000
2,855,000
1,136,000
2,857,000

Refundable
Tax Credit
$647
$172
$56
$42
$43
$299
$78
$116
$83
$163
$126
$63
$82
$50
$318
$55
$287
$46
$247
$101
$317
$215
$309
$43
$53
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Montana
Nebraska
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
West Virginia
Wisconsin
District of
Columbia

$159,000,000
$114,446,275
$350,615,243
$32,187,460
$2,826,000,000
$914,000,000
$15,627,995
$256,043,750
$63,555,342
$411,000,000
$1,100,300,000
$41,846,348
$121,189,494
$92,421,733
$37,829,036
$303,532,120
$47,690,959
$730,100,000
$127,000,000

500,000
984,000
4,223,000
851,000
8,946,000
4,354,000
409,000
5,398,000
1,693,000
1,801,000
6,018,000
511,000
2,063,000
1,372,000
333,000
4,053,000
741,000
2,920,000
349,000

$318
$116
$83
$38
$316
$210
$38
$47
$38
$228
$183
$82
$59
$67
$114
$75
$64
$250
$364

Table 8 provides estimates of the size of the refundable tax
credit for retirement in each of the forty-two states (including
Washington, D.C.) that collect an income tax on earnings. This
figure is expressed as the quotient of the total cost of retirement
expenditures in a state and the total number of workers in that
state.
D. CALCULATING NUMBER OF WORKERS ABLE TO TAKE
ADVANTAGE OF A REFUNDABLE CREDIT
To estimate the number of workers in each state who would
benefit from the conversion of retirement tax expenditures into
refundable tax credits, we first calculate the fraction of workers
who do not participate in a retirement plan at work (or through
their union) in each state.125 We then multiply this fraction by
the 2014 annual average employment level for each state, in order

125. Participation in a retirement plan at work requires the employer to offer a
retirement plan to their workers and for workers to be eligible and to choose to
participate in such a plan. See John Turner et al., Defining Participation in Defined
Contribution Pension Plans, BUREAU OF LAB. STATS., MONTHLY LAB. REV. 36, 36-37,
42 (Aug. 2003), http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2003/08/art3full.pdf.
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to arrive at the number of workers who are not participating in a
retirement plan at work in each state and who are, therefore, not
benefitting from the current retirement tax incentive. In other
words, these are the workers who stand to benefit from converting
retirement tax expenditures into refundable tax credits (see Table
9).

TABLE 9. NUMBER OF WORKERS WHO STAND TO BENEFIT
FROM REFUNDABLE TAX CREDITS 126

State

Fraction of
Workers
Who do Not
Participate in
an EmployerSponsored
Retirement
Plan (2012)

2014
Employment
Level (Annual
Average)

United States
(National)
Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas

0.60

146,305,000

Number of
Workers Who
do Not
Participate in
an EmployerSponsored
Retirement
Plan as of
2014
87,783,000

0.58
0.66
0.65
0.64
0.58
0.55
0.59
0.59
0.54
0.62
0.58
0.56
0.54
0.57

2,013,000
2,869,000
1,218,000
17,298,000
2,670,000
1,773,000
426,000
4,371,000
639,000
735,000
6,065,000
3,047,000
1,633,000
1,434,000

1,161,452
1,882,631
796,525
11,051,443
1,548,600
975,150
251,340
2,587,337
347,076
452,855
3,521,499
1,711,644
880,627
818,203

126. Participation rates are calculated from March 2013 Current Population
Survey data for U.S. workers. Employment levels per state are from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics. States are sorted by decreasing the size of their employment level.
See Ghilarducci et al., supra note 7, at 15.
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Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
West Virginia
Wisconsin
District of
Columbia

0.61
0.65
0.59
0.52
0.56
0.59
0.53
0.64
0.59
0.62
0.59
0.58
0.72
0.59
0.63
0.57
0.59
0.62
0.60
0.56
0.57
0.59
0.62
0.60
0.55
0.54
0.54
0.50

1,876,000
2,021,000
656,000
2,915,000
3,349,000
4,408,000
2,855,000
1,136,000
2,857,000
500,000
984,000
4,223,000
851,000
8,946,000
4,354,000
409,000
5,398,000
1,693,000
1,801,000
6,018,000
511,000
2,063,000
1,372,000
333,000
4,053,000
741,000
2,920,000
349,000

1,150,307
1,311,329
388,252
1,528,903
1,871,068
2,617,841
1,509,685
728,2070
1,690,669
311,404
578,024
2,433,660
612,203
5,307,365
2,747,885
231,292
3,159,542
1,048,392
1,088,922
3,358,076
291,700
1,223,594
846,416
199,230
2,213,049
398,006
1,588,315
175,737

Table 9 estimates the total number of workers, in each state,
who stand to benefit from a retirement credit. At the federal level,
87.7 million workers stand to benefit from the conversion of the
deduction to a credit. The majority of the beneficiaries, 68.6
million, are from states that collect an income tax on earnings.
These 68.6 million workers will also qualify for state credits,
which would supplement the federal credit of $647.

